

*For the APOLOGY for so late a Publication, see
the next Page.*

THE
ANALYSIS
OF A NEW
QUACK-MEDICINE,
CALLED AN
ANTIDOTE, &c.

By a MEMBER of ONE of the INFERIOR

CORPORATIONS.

DUBLIN:

Printed in the YEAR, MDCCCLXVI.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THIS should have been published last Monday, but such is the Liberty of the Press in this Land of Freedom, that the Printer absolutely refused to meddle with it, from the fear of being sent to Newgate. "Write for the C—rt—rs," said he, "and I shall be glad to deal with you. Yes, yes, I like the Things that are spread like Wild-fire thro' the Kingdom, for HIS ———'s SER—CE." "But, Sir, in such Cases, is there no Danger to be apprehended from the Mob?" ——— The Man stared at the Question with a mixture of Surprise and Contempt. "The Mob!" quoth he, "how the D—l should the Mob know what's doing in my Printing-Office, unless I tell them? Or how the D—l should even those amongst them who can read, know what I have published, unless I put my Name to the Title-Page? Or if they should find me out, let them pull down my House, with all my Heart. I know who would pay for my Damages. And tho' mayhap, we have no great Opinion of the generosity of some Folks, yet a poor Man might expect something handsome, when, as we all know, the Money was not to come out of their own Pockets.—But go to my Neighbour, ——— he is a Patriot, and a speaker in the Common-Council: He'll deal with you." I took his Advice; and his Neighbour after some Days taken to consider, was at last prevailed on to print for me.—This is the true History of my long delay in this Publication.



THE ANALYSIS, &c.

IF any of those poor brutes, my brethren of the lower Corporations in the City of Dublin, should not have sense enough to understand my title-Page, I must inform them, (if it be indeed possible to make them understand me) that I mean to enter into a fair examination of a late Pamphlet entitled an ANTIDOTE, &c. And I hope I shall not be thought disqualified for the office I have undertaken, when I begin with confessing fairly, that from the very first glance I cast on the title of this Pamphlet, I conceived no very favourable impression either of the work, or the Author.

It is an old saying, that *every man after forty is either a fool or a Physician*. Now, as I have happily arrived at this true medical period, in a sound state of body, and, I am willing to believe, of mind, I pretend to some little knowledge in the healing-Art myself. Thus far at least I have learned, that it is not every bold, vapouring pretender, that should be trusted to feel the pulse, and tamper with the constitution of the body,—natural or political. And as to your advertising-Doctors, Nostrum-mongers, or publishers of infallible ANTIDOTES, I hold the whole tribe in contempt.

But when I find our present Doctor so very awkward at his trade, as not to be able even to

draw up a little preliminary Quack-Advertisement with the least plausibility, or the slightest appearance of candor or *truth*, when he stands detected by the meanest mechanick in the City, before he has proceeded thro' five lines; I am ready to cry out in the language of his Corporation, BEWARE OF COUNTERFEITS! and to add with his learned Brother Doctor HILL, that, *there is more need for this caution, than an honest man would readily believe.*

And as this Quackery of his resembles the B-ll, he would recommend to us, in bearing, on first view a very suspicious aspect; so it resembles it, in another material point, that of not being altogether so necessary as he would make us believe, even if it had been administred in due season. And this he himself is weak enough to acknowledge at setting out. For we find on turning to the first pages of his work, that he *cannot but hope* that the Merchants instead of swallowing L—s's poison, have dashed the cup away with a *just resentment*: nay, that he *supposes it not possible for them to be perverted by the bungling incendiary.* — Where then is the occasion for him or his *Antidote*? Or, in the name of wonder, what a strange Doctor is this, who professes to cure those whom he *cannot but hope* are in perfect health, and offers his druggs, when he *supposes it not possible* that there can be the least occasion for them!

If one of us plain men may venture to turn him into plain English, I think what he says, is in substance, this.—“Gentlemen, to be sure you are
“in perfect good health; nor is it possible you
“should ever want my assistance. However, as the
“Rats, Cats and Dogs of this City, have slipp'd
“thro' my fingers, I can't try my medicine on
“them,

“ them, (as modeſter Quacks do, before they
 “ venture to praſtiſe on their betters) yet this me-
 “ dicine of mine is too good to be loſt. I have
 “ prepared it, and you ſhall take it. You are my
 “ patients and my property. Sick or well—I care
 “ not. The Doſe may be nauſeous, and the in-
 “ gredients dangerous—yet down they ſhall go:
 “ nor muſt you make a wry face. They would
 “ have done you a world of ſervice laſt *Friday*,
 “ and therefore you ſhall take them *now*. And
 “ if you won’t pay me my fee, I know who will.”

—Such, I take to be his language; and it is a
 language not well calculated to prejudice us in his
 favour.

But I have another prejudice againſt him which
 ariſes from a cauſe ſtill more important than the
 abſurdity or inconfiſtency of his declarations; I
 mean from his betraying a heart and diſpoſition
 utterly unfriendly and averſe to Liberty. I found
 my aſſertion on two proofs which he himſelf will not
 preſume to controvert. I mean his fulſome un-
 neceſſary, and therefore officious and impertinent,
 civilities to thoſe of higher rank, and his insolence
 and ſcurrility to us his inferiours.—He begins
 with all ſolemnity of phraſe, by informing his
 readers, that *their R-pr-----ves in P-r-----t, are*
the proper and FAITHFUL Guardians of their
Rights and Liberties. Far be it from me to at-
 tempt to invalidate this honourable testimony in
 favour of ſo auguſt an Aſſembly! Far be it, my
 Brethren, from any of us little men, to ſay or to
 inſinuate, that place, penſion, bribe, or promiſe,
 Jobbs or Champagne, ever influenced the conduct
 of any one M-b-r: that a ſqueeze by the hand
 ever ſtified the clamours of conſcience, or a merry
 jeſt ever ſerved as an argument in favour of pro-
 ſtitution.

stitution. No! let this doughty Champion throw down his gauntlet, and bluster at his pleasure.— And surely no doughty Champion, except Squire DYMMOCK himself, ever threw down his gauntlet, and blustered upon safer ground.

But good Doctor, why not reserve a little pitance of the civility you thus *lavish* on the rich for us poor creatures who *want* it? In good truth I think it a little hard, that Gentlemen who can descend to court, cajole and flatter those of our Rank, when on certain occasions they apply for our votes and interests, should change their notes, and brawl with so much virulence, when their turns have once been served; that after all their honey'd Speeches, they should at last roar into our ears this mortifying truth, that we are a parcel of stupid, ignorant, insensible, impenetrable Dolts and Idiots. Alas, I fear this heavy accusation, may with too great justice be extended to the lower part of the whole kingdom, when we consider what sort of people we mechanicks have sometimes admitted into our Books, and sometimes into P———. And what is still more mortifying is, that we are not only Dolts and Idiots, but the only dolts and idiots in Society. It is not known that folly and stupidity have ever dared to visit our superiors. Their views are enlarged and generous, never confined to mean and sordid objects; their minds are never clouded by sloth and luxury; nor their abilities drown'd in Drunkenness and Debauchery. We have never seen an idiot Member of any great Assembly impenetrably ignorant of the purport of the plainest question or transaction, led about as in a halter, by a father or a governour. We have never known one of your fine men of quality rise up, with all the confidence of dullness and stupidity, and utter
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his odious nonsense, in a dialect the most shocking to a *polished* or an *honest* ear. When have we ever known among our betters, a little prattling, mincing minion discharge his frippery nothings against reason and argument; or a Boy S—mangle his half-gotten Lesson? Or if we had seen, or imagined we had seen such things, should our reverence for those above us be at all impaired? No! for a wonderful discovery has at last been made, a discovery reserved for this discovering age, which with a dash of a pen can at once establish the propriety of the most monstrous positions, a discovery which no man in his senses would venture to obtrude but upon such understandings as our's——That a person may speak in a manner worthy of a *Roman* or a *British* Senate, without the least particle of any thing which deserves the name of sense or argument.——Let us Rats, and Cats, and Dogs look with reverence on this Mystery, which indeed we are utterly incapable of comprehending.

But why RATS?—A Rat is an odious, black, hard-featured Animal, that nestles securely in a fat Cheshire-Cheese, dips his whiskers in every good Dish he can come at; and riots on the labours of the honest and industrious, to the great loss and impoverishment of their families, without being the least use or ornament to the creation.——A word in your ear—Don't you think the appellation fitter for some folks, than for us?

If we must be CATS, our consolation is that a Cat is in it's nature, a good humoured gentle, harmless, domestick Animal; sometimes very useful in hunting down Vermine. Stroak us kindly, and we cock our tails, purr, and lick your hands. And should we ever raise our backs and spit, it must be, when we are provoked by insolent

insolent oppression, and wanton cruelty. We aim only at self-defence ; but if we must be worried, let our Enemies tremble : for we can Scratch deeply, and as we have nine lives, we are not easily subdued.

As to DOGS, *they're honest creatures, and ne'er betray their MASTERS.* We are ready to acknowledge that we are *jolly dogs, stout and sturdy dogs, honest dogs, and faithful dogs.*—But as to *Sad dogs, false dogs, yelping unlick'd whelps, or fawning Curs,*—let such titles be dealt to those who deserve them.

And thus, having paid my acknowledgments to this Quack Doctor for his civilities, I proceed to examine particularly the several ingredients of his Antidote, or in other words, to consider what he hath been pleased to offer, in order to reconcile us to this *altered Law*, which hath been the Subject of so much clamour.

He *was surprised*, he says, *to find this excellent Bill, opposed, in every period of it's progress, with such unwearied Obstinacy.*—So was not I.—An obstinate opposition was what I expected and wished for, even before I was fully possessed with the nature and tendency of the *alteration*. And my reasons are these—A method of suspending the execution of the Corn B-ll had been devised and prescribed by our H—— of C——, which, my respect to that Assembly naturally led me to consider as the *proper and constitutional* method.—But this it seems did not satisfy, and something of a quite different nature had been *inserted* most unexpectedly, by a Servant or Servants of the C—n in another Kingdom, (as I conceive) of whose abilities or zealous attachment to the interests of this Country, I had not formed quite so high an opinion as I entertained of the united wisdom and integrity of our H——

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of C——s.—As I looked down from the Gallery of a certain chamber, (fully possessed with that honest indignation which we free Citizens feel at *any* alteration of an Irish B-ll.) I thought I could perceive something of surprize and consternation.—Officers of St—— and Servants of G——t, RETIRING ;—or as I was almost tempted to call it, flying with Shame and Confusion from the storm of popular discontent which they saw impending.—When I saw some Gentlemen ashamed I naturally concluded, that this must be occasioned by some thing *very Shameful*, (tho' even then I ventured to foretell that their fellow-labourers would soon oblige them to return to their posts, and take their share of publick Odium.)—Thus at first view, as I before observed, this *altered* B-ll wore a suspicious aspect. And when I had listened to the Arguments urged against the alteration, (for with due submission to superior understandings, I venture to assert that arguments were urged against it) it was natural to expect that some attempts must have been made to detect their fallacy, or to expose their futility. But when I found no such attempts made, no refutation offered, but that grand one called the QUESTION ! when, notwithstanding the well know zeal of the other side, the arguments of the Minority remained *unanswered*, it was reasonable for a plain man to conclude that they were really *unanswerable*.

Such then were the grounds of those prejudices which we *without doors* originally conceived against this *altered* B-ll. Whether they were conceived reasonably or no, and whether the sentiments we have expressed on this occasion were just, or unjust, will appear by examining what this Author calls *his state of the Question*, and his *clear and artless* examination of the nature of this *Alteration* ; on which, I presume, he

and his party must consent to rest the whole merits of the cause

An Alteration, saith he, has been made in the Bill after it was transmitted to Great Britain.—— That surely was no innovation!——Confident as this writer seems of the ground on which he stands, yet, one might perhaps add this to the instances of his disingenuousness or his ignorance. For tho' it may not be so properly called an *innovation*, because a vicious practice of this kind may have been tolerated in more instances than it ought (for it ought not to have been tolerated in one, as appears from the *rectitude* of the practice being now inferred merely from the *sufferance* of it)—tho' I say it may therefore not be so properly called a *Novelty* at least—yet this Writer must be told that the Bill's being altered in E——d, was a sufficient objection in itself—that any alteration of our Bills in E——d, is contrary to POYNING'S Law (as it is not impossible but that the publick may at some time have the pleasure to hear demonstrated)—that every Law so altered is by the 11th of ELIZ. void and of no effect, and this last altered Law among the rest, thank God! —— This I say the writer might have known—And that the Minority rested their opposition to this B-ll merely upon it's own Demerits, solely from strictness and accuracy of Argumentation (as even WE could perceive) and in order to avoid complicating the Question, or multiplying objections from different Quarters, where one was fully sufficient.

And when the reader attends to the true state and purport of the new Insertion, he will possibly be tempted to stare with some surprize at the *precedent* brought by this writer to justify it. That of the reign of Philip and Mary is given up, as directly repugnant to the point it was brought to establish.

establiſh. The ſuſpenſion in that caſe being by *Proclamation* and under the great Seal of *Ireland*: that is, with an appropriated appendage of his ſupreme power over *this* Kingdom, and expreſſly by *virtue* of that ſupreme power without any *foreign council*, or *appendage*. But now we have another precedent from the glorious times of *George* the Second, which would compleatly answer the purpoſe—only for two ſmall objections. The firſt is that it is no precedent at all of *any* ſuſpenſion of a Law. But an inſtance of a power veſted in his M—y to *exempt* thoſe Abſentees from the *penalty* of four Shillings in the pound, whom he ſhall judge proper. Here is one material difference—And the other is (as the Author ſtates it, and it is a *very material* one) that the preſent *ſuſpenſion* is, by his M—y ſitting, acting, attended, and aſſiſted, as K—g of Great Britain; as an act, part, or conſequence of his ſovereignty over that Kingdom, whereas the *exempting* clause of *George* the ſecond is, by an *Order under his Sign Manual*, that is, by the King, acting in *perſon*, as K. of *Ireland*, without the intervention of any Aſſembly whatever which is the peculiar appendage of *another* and *diſtinct* Sovereignty. To borrow a ludicrous illuſtration from a good humoured Addreſſor, on whoſe work I have juſt caſt my eye. Suppoſe his M—y had his *Engliſh* and his *Iriſh Night Gown*, or as that is not a proper image of the wakefullneſs of his Maſteſty's adminiſtration, let us ſay his *Engliſh* and his *Iriſh robes*. And that according as he wore one or other of thoſe, he acted as King, and by virtue of his authority over one or other of theſe Kingdoms. Suppoſe then, *Iriſh* Affairs were preſſing, and that he were adviſed to huddle on his *Engliſh* Robes. I humbly conceive that a miniſter who was a good friend to Ireland, might fairly ſay that this would be very exceptionable in

It's fair and natural construction, dangerous in the inferences and consequences which must be deduced from it; that so much haste was not at all necessary because no great time could be lost in waiting for the proper Robes. Or at worst that the loss of time could not be so dangerous as the exceptionable precedent. This, I say, might be fairly urged. But commend me to the honest fellow, who should rise up on this occasion, and cry out, *Psaw! you're a pack of fools. I tell you, his M—y has often transacted such Irish Affairs as these, in his ENGLISH Robes. Here is an instance in point. See! Here, in the Reign of Ge—the second, but the other day, we find that his Ma— transacted Irish affairs of a quite DIFFERENT KIND, in no robes, or in NO NIGHT GOWN AT ALL.*—Can any thing be more pertinent, forcible and convincing!—When the Antidote-Maker thus deigns to ope his mouth

Let no Dog bark!

By the HEADS of the Bill, saith he, as they passed the H— of C—, a power was vested in the Chief Governors and Council [of THIS Kingdom] of Suspending the execution of this Law, [by publick and open PROCLAMATION] and by a clause added in Great Britain, this power of suspension was likewise extended to his Majesty in Council.—The Author seems willing to forget that the words of the clause are, in the Privy Council of GREAT BRITAIN—and this, not by publick Proclamation, but by Order, which from it's Nature may be private and partial. He can best inform us, what it was that tempted him, to falsify or curtail these important Expressions. *This Bill* saith he, [thus altered] vests in his Majesty a power of suspending the execution of it.—Who knows not that the Bill, as it was originally framed, vested this power in his Majesty? But how?

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As King of IRELAND—acting by his *delegates*, and in them, exercising his *independent* Sovereignty, and supreme executive power over this his loyal Kingdom?—Why should not the Merchants have been told at once? or were they like their brethren so great Dolts that they could not discern at once, without being told, that the *alteration* vested a power in his M—y acting in, and with the participation of a Council, which is the *proper* and *peculiar appendage* of his executive administration, as Sovereign of *Great Britain*, acting in his official capacity as Sovereign of *Great Britain*, (and therefore by fair and clear implication) acting by *virtue* of this Sovereignty, (a power I say) of suspending the execution of a Law made in *this*, his *other* kingdom, where we are bound to believe, that he enjoys, and acts by virtue of another distinct Sovereignty, independent, and unconnected with any Council, assembly, or constitution in any other Kingdom upon Earth?—This is the real State of the Question; but a State of it, not quite so convenient for our Author's purpose,—as we may judge from his stopping at the word, “Council” and omitting, “of *Great Britain*.”

His distress indeed throughout the whole of the subject is evident; and particularly appears in his stating propositions for the Minority which they never supported; that he may confute something, tho' it be his own.

The first proposition which the author of the Antidote has imposed upon the Minority, is, “*That the King and Council are the Executive power of Great-Britain* ;” a position which it is false that the Minority sustained. They said uniformly, and truly, I believe, that his *Majesty*, is *King*, and *Executive power*, of *Great-Britain* ; and that the *Privy Council of Great-Britain*, is the

the *Executive Council* of *Great-Britain* ; not of *Ireland* ; that it is the *proper* and *distinguishing appendage* to his Majesty, as King and Executive power of *Great-Britain* ; and *marks, denotes* and *characterizes* him in *that* Capacity. This I venture to assert was the position of the Minority. I heard it repeatedly urged, and in a manner that impressed it strongly on my memory which is not a weak one ; and which has been refreshed by conversing much upon this subject with my fellow-citizens who are universally alarmed, and particularly with one of them who in my judgment is something of a Politician and Philosopher, and to whom I am obliged for correcting this work in some places with respect to which his recollection of what had passed in a certain assembly was more perfect than mine. That the author of the *Antidote* however may consider my friend as a *human* being, whatever he may consider me, I must inform him that my friend, though not a *member* of *P——t*, is a member of the *Guild of Merchants*. Perhaps therefore, he may wonder the less, if with the assistance of such a person, I should be able not only to *articulate*, but to *argue*. The assertion of the Minority I have mentioned ; and they seemed to think that no man in his senses could suppose that his Majesty acting in the *Privy Council* of *Great-Britain* could be mistaken for the King, or Executive power of any *other* Country, than of *Great-Britain*. They allowed, and they gloried in it, that *one* and the same *person*, is King and Executive power of *both* Kingdoms. But they maintained that though he is *single* in *person*, he is *double* in *office* ; that he is *one*, and the *same*, as a man ; but that he constitutes *two distinct magistrates* : that we are not to infer *official*, from *personal Identity* ; and that his *natural unity*, does not prevent his *political*

dividuality

dividuality, as my friend expressed it. This they maintained, and therefore they maintained that his *proper* and *distinguishing appendage*, as the Executive power of *one* Kingdom, ought not to have been applied to him, as the Executive power of the *other* : and that the very *Identity* of *person*, which the author of the Antidote seems to object to their opposition, is the best justification of it ; because, from that *identity* of *person*, a *confusion* of *office*, if not carefully prevented, must *necessarily* arise.

The *Second* proposition ascribed by the author of the Antidote to the Minority, is, “ *That the Lord Lieutenant and Council are the Executive power of this Kingdom.*” If he mean by this, that the Lord Lieutenant and Council are the executive power of this kingdom, *exclusively* of his Majesty and otherwise than by *delegation* from him ; then it is false that the Minority ever asserted this position. If he mean any thing else, he either means what can be nothing to his argument, or he means nothing at all. And here I must observe that in the first proposition he mentions, “ *The King and Council,*” but omits to mention “ *of Great Britain ;*” and that in this second proposition he mentions “ *Lord Lieutenant and Council,*” but omits to mention “ *of Ireland,*” because these *additional* words would suggest a *material difference* to the most vulgar observer, even to myself ; and mark that evident *distinction* which was made by the opponents to the B—ll, but which the *candid* writer of the Antidote wishes to conceal. As to the matter of this second proposition, the Minority asserted that his Majesty, as King of Ireland, is the executive power of this country ; or, by *delegation* his Substitutes ; with the Privy Council of *Ireland*, which in many cases acts as a *part* of the executive, in conjunction with
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the Chief Governor, or Governors. They asserted that the Privy Council of *Ireland* is the proper and constitutional *Council* for the *executive* power of *Ireland*; and they might ask, if in the *Br—sb* Par——t it were proposed, to give a power of suspending a *Br—sb* law to his Majesty in, or by and with the advice of his Privy Council of *Ireland*, whether it would not be *instantly* rejected, as a *dangerous solecism*; though many things might be admitted by a nation *superior* in *strength*, and of *uncontroverted* title, which an *inferior*, and a *threatened* nation, could not admit with safety?

The *Third* proposition which the author of the Antidote gives to the Minority, is, *That the Executive powers in the two kingdoms are different.* If he mean, that the Minority asserted that they were *distinct* in *office*, though *united* in *one* person; it is true: But if he states this, which he seems to do, as a consequence deduced by the Minority from his two *preceding* propositions, he, for so much, departs from truth. And this shews the futility of the *syllogism*, as it were, which follows in the second page of the Antidote after this; and in which is included the whole of this author's flimsy argument. There he denies the two propositions he before *falsely* ascribed to the Minority; and in consequence thereof, concludes that this third proposition, viz. "*that the executive powers of the two countries are different or distinct,*" is false likewise. Thus he *assumes* that the Minority maintained two false propositions which they never thought of; and that they inferred a third from those two, which they never did infer from them; and that this third proposition must therefore be false. A species of *Logic*, new to the *University*, I persuade myself; nay even to the *Guild of Merchants*: and yet it is all that this ingenious performer has produced. Perhaps, indeed, it is as much as the subject

subject will admit. For what artifice can *even* perplex a point, so clear in principle as this; that the *same person* may at the *same time*, be invested with *two distinct* magistracies: and that certain *modes* of acting, certain *circumstances*, certain *appendages*, * *adjuncts* and *assistants*, may be proper to him in *one* capacity; and *improper* and *incongruous* in the *other*?

The *fourth* proposition which the author of the Antidote ascribes to the Minority, is; "*That whenever it shall happen, that the two kingdoms have the same Executive power, the consequence must be that they will have the same Legislative also.*" Now it never was asserted by the Minority that the latter *must* be; or that it was an *inevitable* and a *necessary* consequence of the former, as the Antidote has unfairly insinuated. If such were the *necessary* consequence, the *guilt* of those who should abet such an innovation would be *unparalleled*. What then was asserted by the Minority? That the *Crowns* of the two Countries *only*, were *united*; but that the *Kingdoms* were *distinct*. That from his Majesty's being the *Executive* power of *each*, as being the *King* of *both*, nothing could possibly be inferred further than the union of the *crowns*: But that, if by an act of *our* Legislature, we allowed that the privy-council of *Great-Britain* (who have no *relation* to us; who belong to *another* country; who are a body *contradistinguished*, *consigned*, and *appropriated*, to a *different* Kingdom) were proper *appendages*, or *assistants* to the *Executive* power of *this* Kingdom; that it might be construed to indicate something *more* than an union of *Crowns*: and that from any thing like a *national* union, an union of *States*; or an union of *Legislative*, as well as of *Executive* Councils, might possibly be inferred. That inferences in

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* See the Protest of the Lords.

favour of the most *momentous* claims, had been made upon less plausible grounds; and that a weak nation ought to be as circumspect with regard to its rights, as an unfriended virgin with respect to her reputation.

The fifth proposition ascribed to the unfortunate Minority, by the author of the *Antidote*, is; *That the power of suspending a law, can be lodged only in the Executive power of the state; and that whenever the power of suspending a law, is vested in any body of men, they become ipso facto, the Executive power.*" Now it was said by the Minority that the power of suspending any law, ought, of *right*, and in strictness of propriety, to be lodged in the *Legislature* which *made* the law; that the same authority which had *created*, might *destroy*; and that the operation of *superior* power might not be controll'd by *inferior*.

Left however the Legislature should not happen to be *sitting* when it might be proper to suspend the law, it was observed, that the Legislature, for convenience, delegated this power to the *Executive* authority of the Country to which the law *belonged*: but that it cannot be *constitutionally* transferred to the Executive power of any *other* Country; and particularly that it cannot be *constitutionally*, or *prudently* deposited in the Executive power of a Country with which there are any *controversies* with respect to *legislative* authority; because, it is in fact, for so much, a *transfer*, or *delegation* of the *legislative* power. If, according to the strange supposition of the author of the *Antidote*, the power of suspension had been given to the Lord Mayor of London (in the common council of London let us add); it would not, I grant, have made the Lord Mayor of London the King or the Executive power of Ireland; nor could

could there be any inference *therefore*, that the Common Council of London were acknowledged by our *own* legislature to be a proper, and constitutional Council, *adjunct*, *appendage* or *assistant* to the Executive power of Ireland; or, which is still worse, that they were a proper *Depositary* for a part of the *legislative* authority of Ireland, for *such* certainly is the power of *suspension*: neither could any further constitutional inferences, *therefore*, have flowed from such an appointment; as there might from the present, in the fears of the Minority, and, it seems, of the Public. The one case, and the other, indeed, are so widely different, that it is absurd to compare them. But surely though it might not be so dangerous, no man could doubt of the impropriety and absurdity of such an appointment; and that a clause depositing such a power in such hands ought to be rejected without hesitation, though it had been the *original* clause, and not an *illegal* and *unconstitutional* alteration. How much more ought this to have been rejected, when inferences of so critical and dangerous a nature, in point of constitution, were possibly deducible from it!

Such and so gross have been the misrepresentations, or misapprehension of the author of the Antidote; such and so clear were the arguments and principles of the Minority upon the *merely constitutional* point of this question! I wish, indeed, that I could add the many instances of ministerial encroachments which were enumerated by the Minority, in order to shew the growth and gradual progress of innovation among us, and to prove the necessity of vigilance and caution in points of constitution at present, and for the future, if we were willing to retain the little that is left to us. But this is a part of the subject, which, though it

is extremely material, and was handled with consummate ability, I cannot attempt, as it is so extensive and so delicate.

My friend indeed whom I have so often mentioned could not but observe, he said, in addition to what we had heard elsewhere, that the argument in favour of the alteration (supposing *any* alteration sufferable) was dangerous; that it had been and might be used again for purposes one could not wish to promote. The argument, said he, is, that his Majesty is the Executive power himself; and that it is of no consequence in what *place*, with what *assistants*, in what *manner*, or by what *instruments* he exercises it.

Hence they infer, that the altered B—ll ought to have been accepted; and why? truly because the alteration does not appear to be prejudicial. And are we then to admit novelties in our constitution, as we would give a play-thing to a child, merely because we may not immediately see harm in them? Whoever reads history and politicks, said he, will acknowledge how little men ought to depend upon their sagacity in foreseeing every *possible* consequence of any innovation; and therefore, every wise and honest man ought to oppose *any* innovation, the *great benefit*, or *absolute necessity* of which is not apparent: and even then, he ought to survey it long, and on every side, lest it might have greater *ill* consequences in *future*, than *good* ones in *present*; and after all this, if he *did* adopt it, he ought to adopt it with *fear* and in *trembling*; and to account himself *fortunate*, as well as *wise*, if he never should have cause to *repent* it. I will add, said he, that as an innovation in point of constitution is a precedent *for ever*, nothing of this sort ought ever to be admitted upon a *temporary* view: and therefore, I would have trusted for the prevention of exportation, to the

the resolutions of P——t, passed at the beginning of the Session; and to the alarm they had spread over the country, an alarm at least equal to the likelihood of scarcity;—rather than have admitted a precedent which must last for ever, to obviate the evil of *one* season. This I would have done, said he, had I considered the danger, as *probable*, not *possible* only; had I considered the danger as *still* existing, and not *removed* already in effect by *another* law; and had I considered the bill as well adapted to remedy the evil, and not as likely to *increase*, and indeed to *create* it, in consequence of the *change*, which forms the *innovation*. Thus I should have done, said he; but the wisdom of wiser men, passed it notwithstanding; and without hesitation, without *answering*, or seeming to *weigh* the objections which were made to it; and in the same period of time exactly, and without any further delay, than if it had returned without *any* alteration whatever. Now this, continued he, could arise from nothing but the most unlimited confidence in all E——sh ministers, both now, and for ever hereafter; and a certainty that they would act upon different principles from those by which they have been too frequently actuated heretofore. Nothing but a conviction of this sort could have induced this carelessness, for such I must call it, when I recollect that there has been no instance of a like nature which has not in its consequences proved prejudicial. What novelties indeed, what monsters might not the principle upon which this innovation is defended, introduce into the constitution? It is the mere act of the crown, it is said, and therefore, it is no matter in what place it is done, or with what assistants. The royal assent is the mere act of the crown, and therefore according to this principle, it might as well be given in his Majesty's

Majesty's bed-chamber, or Privy-council-chamber, as from the Throne in the presence of the Lords and Commons of Great Britain: or to bring it more closely to ourselves, his Majesty might cease to give his assent to our laws in this Country, by his Representative, from the throne in the presence of the Lords and Commons of Ireland; and might by a new stroke of political fashion, give his assent to our laws in the parliament of Great Britain, and not in our own parliament. And then I suppose it would be asked, what did it signify? Was it not the same thing? Was it not the mere and sole act of the crown, and was it not a matter of indifference whether the Lords and Commons of one, or of the other country were present? Whether it was done in the parliament of G—t B——n or of Ireland? A thousand instances of the same kind might be mentioned, to shew the danger and absurdity of this principle; and too many examples of such inferences having been made heretofore, to the eternal dishonour of the Makers of them, and still more of the Receivers.

These were some of the arguments which I was able to Collect upon the *constitutional* point of this subject at the time when I sat down to write this Analysis. Since that, my own occupation and the fears of my Printer have delay'd the publication so long, as to make it almost unnecessary perhaps. At least I am sure that no person who heard this subject again publicly discuss'd last Week, will desire any further satisfaction as to the objections in point of Constitution. All the learning, labour, and abilities of adm----n were exerted to support that innovation, but were so clearly overthrown by that Gentleman whom even the author of the Antidote compliments with the eloquence of Rome, or Britain, that the judgment

judgment of the Public is sufficiently settled, I believe, upon that point; and would rather be disgusted than informed by any further application.

I must however observe that many arguments were made use of by the Minority, upon the original debates on this subject, which the candid writer of the *Antidote* never mentions. The *Law* was urged, and has since been allowed by the advocates for the alteration, to be unnecessary; and therefore in itself prejudicial, as every prohibition of trade must be. The *alteration* also was urged to be unnecessary, because no man living can suppose that the Governors and Council of Ireland would refuse any reasonable desire from the other side of the water; and a very unreasonable desire they ought not to comply with, though perhaps they would. Any thing therefore that could reasonably be desired, was provided for by the original bill; and the alteration consequently could be inserted with no other view, at best, than to ensure the success of some so unreasonable a desire as that they would be afraid to trust it to the Privy Council of Ireland; though most of the members of it are in office, and though they can all be put in, or removed, at the pleasure of the Crown. What reasonable desire need they have feared to trust to such a body? Or is it likely that such a body would have refused them anything they wished with respect to this matter, except it were to starve themselves as well as their countrymen? Is not this the fair state of the case? And is it not therefore clear, that this alteration was wholly unnecessary, except it were necessary for us to give to others the power of starving us, instead of reserving to ourselves the power of feeding ourselves first with our own corn, with the fullest and most

most cordial intention to assist our Sister Island if we had any superfluity which could be applied to her convenience? This was all that could be fairly desired, and more than that we ought not to have given. Neither ought we to empower the ministers of any other Country to gratify their creatures, or to encrease their influence, at the expence of this Kingdom, and to the hazard of famine perhaps at home, which we have done now as many people think. For they think that ministers may be as ready to suspend this parliamentary Embargo for the profit of their Creatures, as we know they have been to lay on, or to suspend the illegal embargoes which have been often imposed on this Country under pretence of prerogative; and which have been made instruments, as this may be, of private benefit, or court influence, and not of public advantage. They therefore urged that this alteration was not only unconstitutional, illegal, and unnecessary; but highly prejudicial in itself.

Will the author of the Antidote deny that these and many more arguments of the same nature were used by the Minority? If they were to be answered, why did he not answer them? And if they were not to be answered, why were they not acknowledged? Thus we see that this author overlooked, wholly almost, all the arguments he ought to have answered; mistated and misrepresented the rest.

We have seen his success in overthrowing the arguments of others. How does he establish his own? Or, not to speak of establishing anything (a task too hard, for this author) what arguments does he even attempt to advance? He says that it is better "that the suspension of this law should depend upon the order of his Majesty, *publickly*, made in the midst of his Council (of Great-Britain) than

than upon a *private* order, which he might sign in his *Closet*. So then this writer at last acknowledges that though the act is merely and solely the King's, yet there is some difference arising from the place in, and the persons amongst whom, the matter is transacted. He allows too (surely he did not reflect, or was not quite awake) that the more *public* the act is the *better* and the more *private* the *worse*. Now any act done in another Country, with respect to this Kingdom, cannot be so well known in this Country, as an act of the same degree of notoriety which was done in this Kingdom. That is, it cannot be known so soon, so generally, and so equally. Much less is there the same opportunity for the people of this Country to interpose upon the first suggestion of such a thing, should they think it prejudicial; if it is to be done in another Kingdom: As there would be if the act were to take it's rise in the Capital of this Country. I say therefore that if the acts were to be exactly of the same degree of notoriety in themselves, it would be better that the order should take it's rise here, than in another kingdom. How much more preferable then according to this author's principle of notoriety, would an order be, made by the chief Governors and Council of Ireland, and issued by *proclamation* (according to the *original* clause of suspension) than an order made by the King in the Council of Great Britain, *not* to be followed and made publick by Proclamation! How much more preferable, I say, in point of convenience and publick utility, than the *inserted* clause, supposing the constitution not to be concern'd!

What does our author say in the next paragraph? That if the "Council of Great Britain" had not been added, and if therefore the Order

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could have been signed in his Majesty's *closet*, that such a *private* Order might possibly be obtained *clandestinely*, by *improper influence*, upon *improper and private motives*, as he reminds his Countrymen that *Embargoes* have been ; but that now this cannot be apprehended, for that the *Council of Great Britain*, will be *Witnesses of his Majesty's Conduct*, and the *Judges of the propriety of it*. Now I thought that the first and only defence of this alteration was, that nobody could object to the Clause so far as respected his *Majesty*, and that therefore the *whole* Clause was unexceptionable, for that the *whole* power was given to his Majesty ; that the " Council of Great Britain " were mere pack-thread and paper ; that they were only Spectators of a puppet-show, but that his M——ty did every thing. Such was the doctrine : But now it seems his M——ty is to be endured for the sake of his Council of Gr——t B——n, and not his Council of G——t B——n for the sake of his M——ty ; now he is to come in upon their shoulders, not they upon his. Before, they were said to be so excluded from any share of power in the matter, that they were harmless ; but they are now admitted to so much authority, as that they will be of infinite service. Before, his M——ty was the common father of his two K——ms, and could not be supposed to sacrifice one to the other. But now we are to put our trust in the Council of G——t B——n. They are to be *witnesses* ; they are to be *our spies*, upon his conduct, for fear he should injure us ; and judges of the propriety of that conduct, for fear he should blunder : And we are to trust to the Council of *another* Country ; and not to the King of our *own*. Who would imagine that this author was

was an advocate for Gov——t, properly so called, that is for his M——ty? But it is no new thing to see those who call themselves friends and servants to his M——ty, because they support all the Jobs and dirty Work of Adm——n, it is no new thing to see them acting in open violation of his M——y's authority, in contradiction to King's letters, and King's letters patent: Nay, it is no new thing to see them whilst they are slaves to his Sub-t-tes, cast insults upon his M——ty himself; and deprive his Royal Family of those honours which are their due, in order to throw them upon their own patrons, though the most odious persons to his M——y, perhaps in all his dominions.

As to the two next Paragraphs, they only say that we have the strongest reason to believe, that every thing will be done in the best manner for us: And indeed it is artful in the author, who finds that after all he has said, it is still clear that we have put ourselves in the power of others, to endeavour to convince us that we may be easy, and that no bad use will be made of that power. This however, is a doctrine of unlimited confidence which no man of common sense ever practices in private life, and which no man of common honesty ever preaches in public concerns. Before our author concludes however, he must be *candid*, he says: It is almost time; and what is his candour? He confesses this is an *innovation*, and a *material* one; that this is the first *Embargo* which was ever laid on by our Par——t; that this is the first time that his M——y ever *delegated* this prerogative to us,—though he has indeed, says the author ironically, *presumed* to reserve to himself a liberty of *reasssuming* this authority or *prerogative*. Now this must be confessed to be a

piece of very impudent nonsense. We had been talking as if Par——t had *delegated* part of their *legislative* power, in *delegating* the power of *suspension*; but our author tells us very modestly, now, that his M——y was all the time *delegating* to P——t his *prerogative* of laying on Embargoes; and that his M——y has been singularly gracious and indulgent, in permitting our P——t to make a law to prohibit the exportation of our own corn. Thus the power of embargo, which has been exercised only under the pretence of necessity; which has been often, even according to this writer, shamefully abused; which has been always objected to as illegal; and which is not endured in G——t B——n, is set above the whole legislature; and it is insinuated that it would have been presumption in our P——t to have at all interfered with it; and it is asserted that an act of P——t which touches upon a thing so sacred, is a *material innovation* in our constitution. What can be more abominable than this? But the truth seems to be that the P——t intended by this Act, to avoid Embargoes, as illegal, and as almost always abused; and therefore, they must with reason object to the *inserted* clause of *suspension*, because it brings back upon them the mischiefs of Embargoes in part, and gives a power to the M——rs of another country, to suspend this law for the same private purposes, for which they have so often taken off Embargoes partially, according to our author's own acknowledgment.

And thus having cleared my way through the strange assertions and misrepresentations of this Writer, I shall say little to his last paragraph, in which he expresses his abhorrence for the author
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of the address, though he says it is something softened by the consideration of his various infirmities. I have little to say to personal matters; but I cannot help believing that the forbearance which this writer bespeaks for the author of the address, whom, as he put his name to his address, he might as well have called Doctor Lucas; is founded in something else than tenderness and lenity. I remember to have seen some things done with respect to that Gentleman which were not of the most compassionate kind; not to speak of Justice, or of the behaviour of Gentlemen. But, says the ingenious writer, experience shews us that like a false religion, he thrives under Persecution. What, then, it is for fear he should thrive that this Gentleman is tender and indulgent to him. It seems too that Mr. Lucas has been persecuted; and this the author of the Antidote allows. Now by whom I ask? When he was banished from his Country he was the favourite of us Cats, Rats, Dogs, and animals of inferior note—and he was persecuted by the P——t. What then, do we at length find this author turned advocate for us against even that august body—Perhaps he will soon support us against the superior Corporations—and even the Guild of Merchants themselves. But we do not desire it; we do not desire to set ourselves up on high; we have a natural reverence for our Superiors till they make themselves contemptible, or odious; we do not desire to be supported against any body of men; we desire only to be supported in our own rights. These we cannot part with—the fear of their being impaired, alarms us—it is this that has spread consternation through this City, a consternation which I have never seen before—for I do not reckon

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on those times to have been times of trial in which the parties of Great men divided and enflamed the nation. That is not the case now. It is upon principle and not upon party that men are afraid now; and when men unite on principle they are strong.

THE END.



